Complementary-safety-assessments-french-nuclear-safety

- 314 - Possibility of using equipment existing on the site The licensee has drawn up the inventory of the intervention means figuring in the PUI and the off-site emergency means that can be called upon. Their availability and robustness in the event of a severe accident have been partially assessed, essentially with respect to an earthquake situation. The emergency premises are housed in a building with a backed-up electrical power supply but which is not built to earthquake design standards and not protected against a toxic or radioactive cloud. The envisaged fallback possibilities are either in CEA Marcoule's PCD, or in another Mélox building, both earthquake resistant and with containment. ASN considers that Mélox must consider the conditions of transfer to the fall-back premises on the Marcoule site in the event of a toxic or radioactive cloud. Moreover, the functionality of the fall-back premises must be ensured with respect to the current organisation of the PCDL. ASN will ensure that these points are addressed to its satisfaction in response to the emergency management requirements. With regard to the internal and external communication means, Mélox indicates that their diversity should ensure the operability of at least one of them. For internal communications, Mélox envisages carrier frequency transmission as a backup means. ASN considers that the working conditions (irradiating or toxic environment, etc.) associated with carrier frequency transmission must be analysed and the feasibility of these measures demonstrated. More generally, ASN will issue a requirement concerning the intervention conditions of emergency management personnel. The technical instrumentation is installed in a building built to seismic standards. Measures envisaged to reinforce the accident management capabilities Implementation of emergency management as provided for in the PUI could be disrupted by problems of material and human resource availability. At organisational level, the deployment of alternating reinforcement personnel would improve emergency management in a lasting situation. As for the material resources, Mélox proposes a preliminary inventory of the possible reinforcements, without giving an implementation schedule. It mentions in particular:  the emergency premises: pre-equipped, positive-pressure sealed tent, deliverable within 48 hours;  acquisition of additional satellite telephones;  reinforcing of the pumping, cooling and emergency electrical power supply means. Mélox does not decide on or make any commitments regarding the implementation of the reinforcement provisions. ASN considers it essential for Mélox to reinforce its material and organisational provisions for severe accident situations. These reinforcements must take into consideration:  the need for coordination between Mélox and CEA Marcoule to ensure the availability of the shared means in the event of a severe accident affecting the two licensees simultaneously;  the consequences of any induced hazardous phenomenon that could occur on the Mélox facility and any neighbouring facility, notably CEA Marcoule (explosion, fire, toxic leak, radioactive releases, etc.). ASN will issue requirements concerning these points, and in particular the emergency premises, the material resources, the means of communication and coordination between neighbouring licensees.

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