- 316 - 6.1.4. Conclusion With regard to the general emergency management provisions for severe accident situations, the reports submitted by the licensees in 2011 meet the initial specifications to varying extents. The ILL has clearly identified the necessary reinforcements and undertaken to implement them. The CEA and AREVA have not made a decision or given a commitment to the implementation of reinforcement provisions, even those that could be achieved rapidly. for the CEA, these provisions will be identified and prioritised after submitting the reports for the centres due in 2012 (CEA Marcoule and CEA Cadarache) and 2013 (Saclay); for AREVA, the licensees undertake to carry out various studies relating to emergency situation management. With regard to the CEA, ASN considers that the centres' reports must assess the availability of the organisational and material provisions for severe accident situations, including the provisions specific to each BNI. With regard to AREVA, ASN considers that the summary inventory drawn up in the CSA reports is just a first step and that the licensees must reinforce the means and facilities. Further to the review of the CSA reports, ASN will issue technical requirements concerning the following points: the emergency management premises; the emergency intervention equipment; the active dosimetry means, radiation protection measuring instruments, personal and collective protective equipment; the technical and environmental instrumentation; the means of communication; the functionality of the command or fall-back premises; coordination further to an accident affecting all or part of the facilities operated by a given licensee on a given site simultaneously; coordination between neighbouring licensees with respect to accident events and induced effects that could hinder the deployment of the emergency response teams. 6.2 Severe accident management per facility 6.2.1. Experimental reactors Osiris The feared severe accident is core meltdown (see § 1). Licensee's accident management organisation A core meltdown accident would be managed from the fall-back centre which enables the safeguard ventilation system and the emergency water make-up circuit to be controlled, and the following elements to be monitored: detection of the low position of the Osiris control rods; the Osiris reactor pool water level; the Osiris reactor pool water temperature; the pressure in the containment; the operation of the nuclear ventilation equipment; the radiological measurements of exhaust stack discharges; the dose rates measured by the radiation protection monitors in the facility.
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