- 319 - With regard to the radiological conditions in the reactor building hall, under the conditions of this scenario, the height of water in the pool would provide radiological protection. An intervention in the reactor building is therefore, in principle, not impossible. If water containment was no longer ensured in spite of the robustness of the pool (designed for a BORAXtype explosive reactivity accident), the containment function would be ensured by the last barrier formed by the reactor building containment. On this account the review concluded that the monitoring means and the actions required to control environmental releases would have to be particularly robust to earthquakes. Assessment of the risks associated with the industrial environment The risks associated with the industrial environment were examined. The general approach adopted by the CEA was firstly to identify - through the Cadarache PGSE (general presentation of the site and facility) and the safety frame of reference in effect - the industrial facilities, hazardous material pipelines and communication routes (road, rails and river) around the site and at the JHR (including those present on the site itself). In a second phase the CEA assessed the potential risks associated with the hazard sources on the basis of the existing studies for the BNIs in question. As concerns the identification of the hazard sources associated with the industrial environment (internal and external), the review found that the CEA did not always indicate the maximum quantities of hazardous materials involved. Indeed, the CEA mentions the presence of ICPEs (installations classified on environmental protection grounds) within the Cadarache site (MADERE, TOTEM, etc.) without demonstrating that these facilities do not present a risk. Moreover the CEA does not give an assessment of the impacts of the dangerous phenomena associated with these hazard sources - possibly compounded in the event of an earthquake or flooding - on the BNI which may have been rendered more vulnerable by the earthquake or flood event. With regard to the industrial facilities off the BNI site, the review highlighted that the CEA lacked sufficient information on their robustness to earthquakes and flooding. The CEA has therefore undertaken to provide an assessment of the induced risks associated with the industrial environment both on and off the sites targeted by the CSAs. This risk assessment will present: a deterministic identification, from hazard studies, of all the hazard situations associated with the industrial environment that can impact the BNIs targeted by the CSAs; an assessment of the impacts of these situations on the BNI, given its condition after an earthquake or flood; a verification of the robustness of the emergency management means for such situations. This is a generic commitment from the CEA for all its BNIs. Assessment of the risks induced by an earthquake Considering earthquake-induced risks, the licensee has studied the following: the risk of internal fire induced by an earthquake; the risk of explosion induced by an earthquake; the risk of flooding induced by an earthquake. With regard to the study of earthquake-induced risks internal to the BNI, the CEA has specified a requirement that "elements important for safety (EIS) that have an earthquake-resistance requirement" should not be vulnerable to fire, explosion or jets of fluid; this results in having design rules for the electrical equipment, nitric acid systems and fluid pipes crossing the electrical rooms, when these elements are situated in "safety-classified" premises. With respect to the DBE, requirements to conserve the integrity or operability of the fire-protection means (automatic fire detection, dry risers, sectorisation) have been specified, as has the preventive inertia of the liquid metal handling cubicle. To limit the effects of a post-earthquake explosion, the gas storage yards will be designed to direct the blast and fragments from an explosion towards an area free of elements important for safety. In the "battery" rooms of safety-classified buildings, the H2 detectors and load cut-off devices must remain operational after an earthquake. With regard to the risk of flooding induced by an earthquake, the CEA concluded that the rupture of the normal, secondary and tertiary cooling systems - which are not built to seismic standards - would not create a
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