- 328 - The licensee has undertaken to integrate in this cross-site study: the means for returning the cooling systems of the pools and concentrated fission production solution storage tanks to service as rapidly as possible; the sizing of the site's water supply resources so that they can cope with the cooling water needs of the accident-stricken units and the fire-fighting needs, and give justifications for how the different water contributions will be prioritised. The licensee has also undertaken to enhance the robustness of the means of resupplying water to the pools and the units accommodating the concentrated fission product solution storage tanks to ensure the rapid resupply of these units with water brought from a relatively invulnerable place, particularly with respect to the possible site disruptions (collapsed building, ICPE-type accident, etc.), releases of radioactive substances or chemicals and increase in radiation levels, without excluding: the installation of pipes between the units housing the concentrated fission production solution storage tanks on the one hand, and the West pond on the other, in view of its situation, which is relatively unaffected by the general state of the site; the pre-positioning of the pumps for collecting water from the retention pits of pools C, D and E accumulated in the building and the multiplying of the points for injecting water into the pools (C, D, E and NPH). The case of the fission production solution concentration evaporators will be examined. ASN considers that the means for resupplying the pools and units housing the concentrated fission product solution storage tanks must be rendered more robust to ensure fast resupply of water. For the legacy waste storage silos (BNI 33, 38 and 80), ASN will ask AREVA to give it a schedule for proceeding with recovery of the effluents contained in the silos as rapidly as possible, along with all the elements justifying its proposal. ASN will also ask AREVA to propose the reinforcement of silo monitoring, of the technical provisions, and of the type of geotechnical containment or equivalent, with the aim of enhancing environmental protection by preventing and mitigating the consequences of a leak from these silos. Others (Mélox, FBFC) Mélox The planned intervention means for each accident situation considered are described in the PUI. Operation is ensured by teams working continuous shifts. These teams are capable of diagnosing the situation and carrying out the actions to help secure the facilities; they can call upon the on-call teams. Moreover, the FLS and SPR (Radiological Protection Service) of the CEA Marcoule, and possibly the SDIS (Departmental Fire and Emergency Service), can provide reinforcement. The emergency management premises are situated in building 502 (non-nuclear). This building dates from before 1992 and has not been designed to current seismic standards or designed to protect the teams against a radioactive or toxic cloud. The licensee has therefore planned for fall-back solutions, either in other Mélox buildings, or within the CEA Marcoule emergency command post. Measures envisaged to reinforce the existing measures and proposed studies In the complementary safety assessment the licensee analysed the consequences of a severe accident affecting the entire Marcoule site and beyond. From this analysis it established a list of the technical means necessary to remedy insofar as possible the consequences of different accident situations: total loss of the water sources; loss of cooling in a storage area; loss of confinement.
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