- 329 - This list comprises: pumping means (one pump with a capacity of 15 m3/h and one with a capacity of 5 m3/h); electrical power supply means (one 100 kVA generator set, two 20 kVA mobile generator sets, 2 transportable fuel tanks); cooling means (a reserve stock of boron in bags, a refrigeration unit and auxiliaries: 52 kVA); handling and storage means (one all-terrain truck, maritime containers, 2-m pierced steel planks); communication means (satellite telephones); emergency premises (pre-equipped, positive-pressure sealed tent). Conclusions on the planned measures to mitigate the consequences (radioactive or chemical releases) in a severe accident situation The emergency organisation and means implemented in an accident situation at the Mélox facility are based on several resources of CEA Marcoule (PCD-L premises, FLS and SPR). It is important that the licensee's cross-site study into emergency management should clearly identify the availability of these means for the hazards defined in the CSA and which would impact simultaneously the Mélox facility and other facilities on the CEA Marcoule site. If availability turns out to be insufficient, the licensee must acquire its own emergency management means that give it intervention autonomy with respect to CEA Marcoule. In the inventory mentioned earlier, AREVA plans sharing certain resources with other facilities belonging to the group. ASN considers that for the Mélox facility the licensee must take into account the risk of a cliff-edge effect associated with loss or deterioration of the last filtration level further to a fire in one of the powders unit rooms concomitantly with an earthquake. It considers that the licensee's ability to implement the appropriate measures to limit the rise in temperature within the required times remains an essential parameter. ASN will issue a requirement on this subject. ASN considers that the licensee must demonstrate that, whatever the extent of sharing of means, it will have the necessary means to intervene on its facility in an accident situation. ASN moreover estimates that the licensee must clarify the conditions of the intervention agreement signed with the CEA Marcoule so that it is guaranteed immediate access to the information of importance for control of the plant: weather alerts, incidents occurring on the other facilities on the site and their consequences. ASN will issue a request to the CEA in this respect. FBFC The licensee identifies two feared severe accidents in the conversion building C1: loss of containment of the 6 cylinders of UF6 and the associated autoclaves heating in the emission zone with loss of containment in the building as well, leading to the release of UO2F2 and HF into the environment; in the HF station: loss of containment of the 2 tanks of concentrated HF at 55% installed in the station, leading to a large release of HF directly into the environment. Identification of the factors potentially hindering accident management and of the resulting constraints (countermeasures that already exist): Generally speaking, for the 2 accidents mentioned above the main factors that could hinder accident management are: loss of tightness of a system containing UF6 (cylinder, autoclave) or HF (system discharging the HF produced by the conversion of UF6, HF tanks), which could create a UF6 leak in the autoclave room or an HF leak in the HF station; loss or malfunctioning of the UF6, uranium or HF detection system, which would prevent rapid detection of the problem;
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