- 343 - 8.3 Improving the robustness of facilities and forthcoming works General requirements applicable to all the licensees Definition of a hard core Following the CSAs of the nuclear facilities conducted in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, ASN considers that the nuclear facilities need to be made more robust to risks that are highly unlikely but not as yet considered in the design of the facilities or following their periodic safety review. This entails providing the facilities with the means to enable them to deal with: a combination of natural phenomena of an exceptional scale and in excess of the phenomena used in the design or the periodic safety review of the facilities; severe situations, in particular long-duration loss of electrical power or cooling, which could affect all the facilities of a given site. Therefore, by 30th June 2012, ASN will require that the licensees identify and justify a "hard core" of robust material and organisational measures, reinforced if necessary, to guarantee the operational nature of the structures and equipment enabling the fundamental safety functions to be performed in these exceptional situations. These measures will ensure ultimate protection of the facilities, with the following three objectives: prevent a severe accident or limit its progression; limit large-scale releases in an accident scenario which could not be controlled; enable the licensee to perform its duties in the management of a crisis. Continued action to ensure the conformity of the facilities The diversity of licensee situations with regard to conformity means that each one has to be individually assessed. Concerning AREVA, given the past history of the sites and the considerable diversity of the facilities, ASN underlines the fact that periodic safety reviews have not yet been carried out on all the facilities, but that they will have to be carried out soon. ASN will thus issue a requirement in this respect, leading to a review of the frame of reference. It considers that the situation needs to be improved and will closely monitor the steps taken accordingly, stipulating performance requirements and the corresponding deadlines. ASN will issue requirements for all the conformity reviews to be submitted no later than 31st December 2014. Concerning CEA, since the 1990s, the BNIs have been the subject of conformity examinations on the occasion of the periodic safety reviews. CEA is taking the necessary steps to remedy any deviations observed. ASN considers that the steps taken by CEA are on the whole satisfactory, even if the lead-times could be improved. Concerning the ILL, the conformity review is considered by ASN to be satisfactory. The licensee performed this exhaustively as part of the CSA approach. Most of the anomalies are related to delays in the processing of nonconformities identified during the previous periodic safety review. The licensee proposed a short-term action plan for dealing with them. Crisis management In order to perform its duties in an emergency situation, the licensee must have a robust organisation, in particular with regard to the extreme situations covered by the CSAs. ASN will thus be requiring that the licensees include organisational and material measures in their hard cores, which are elements essential for crisis management, in other words crisis management premises, material resources needed for crisis management, means of communication and technical and environmental instrumentation. ASN will also be asking that the licensees include in this hard core operational dosimetry resources, measuring instruments for radiation protection and individual and collective protection equipment, because initial experience feedback from crisis management at Fukushima shows that these were lacking.
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