- 345 - Fuel cycle facilities - AREVA Identifying the feared situations In its selection of feared situations, AREVA chose those with the most demanding kinetics in terms of crisis management. ASN considers that the analysis of feared situations needs to be supplemented to take account of accident situation combinations and problems with access to certain facilities, owing to the site context. ASN will be asking AREVA to supplement its identification of feared situations by justifying the selection criteria used and by taking account of potential aggravating factors. Increasing facility robustness to earthquake and flooding risks As the facilities were all designed at different periods, they all have different seismic resistance levels. A distinction therefore needs to be made between facilities for which shutdown is already scheduled in the near future and those which are to continue with long-term operations. For the facilities the licensee wishes to keep in service, ASN will be requesting the necessary reinforcements to guarantee at least the ability to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake SSE. This requirement concerns the TU5/W, Comurhex, Eurodif, FBFC facilities and certain units at La Hague. For the units for which shutdown is already scheduled, in particular on the La Hague site, ASN will be asking the licensee to implement compensatory measures. For the Tricastin site, the licensee will have to reassess the consequences of flooding on the site and propose any necessary measures to take account of the various developments and changes made since the previous studies. Improving risk management For the Tricastin and Romans sites, ASN will be asking the licensee to study and implement effective means of reducing toxic gases, in particular a leak of hydrogen fluoride (HF) gas, uranium hexafluoride (UF6), chlorine (Cl2) and chlorine trifluoride (ClF3). For the Tricastin site, ASN will be asking the platform licensees to take the necessary steps to ensure that they coordinate well in the event of a crisis (consideration of the risks inherent in neighbouring activities, protection of the various crisis management premises, adequacy of the crisis management resources). For the La Hague site, ASN will be asking AREVA to deploy additional, robust means of resupplying water to the pools and the units housing storage tanks for concentrated fission product solutions, as well as means of rapidly restoring cooling of the pools and storage tanks to service. For the silos storing the legacy waste from the La Hague site, ASN will be asking AREVA to submit a schedule for recovery of the legacy effluents as rapidly as possible. ASN will also be asking it to initiate feasibility studies for the deployment of technical arrangements, such as a geotechnical containment or system with equivalent effect, to protect ground and surface waters in the event of a leak from these silos. Research facilities and facilities undergoing decommissioning operated by CEA Reinforcing the robustness of the facilities to the earthquake and flooding risk The CSAs confirmed the elements concerning the seismic risk and resulting from the recent periodic safety reviews, demonstrating that the ATPu facility and the Masurca reactor fissile materials store were not designed to deal with this risk. ASN therefore considers that: decommissioning of the ATPu must be completed as rapidly as possible. As at 30th June 2011, about half the glove boxes had already been processed; the fissile material stored in the Masurca reactor warehouse must be relocated soon to a facility designed in compliance with current seismic standards.
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