- 47 - 3. Summary of targeted inspections conducted in 2011 concerning topics related to the Fukushima accident on Laboratory, Plant, Waste and Decommissioning facilities (LUDD) Summary of the inspections In 2011, inspections were carried out on the high-priority facilities other than the power reactors: all the facilities operated on the AREVA NC site at La Hague; all the facilities operated by AREVA and its subsidiaries on the Tricastin site; the Mélox plant operated by Mélox SA (Marcoule); the FBFC plant operated at Romans-sur-Isère; five facilities operated by CEA: the Osiris reactor (Saclay), Masurca reactor (Cadarache, currently shut down), Phénix reactor (Marcoule, shut down), the ATPu (Cadarache, undergoing decommissioning) and the RJH reactor (Cadarache); this last reactor, which is under construction, underwent only a very partial inspection given the current state of its construction; the high- flux reactor (RHF), operated by the Laue-Langevin Institute in Grenoble. These facilities are characterised by a wide variety of activities, operated in accordance with frames of reference requirements comprising a common part (for example, the fundamental safety rule relative to earthquakes and ministerial orders, especially the orders of 10th January 1984 and 31st December 1999) plus their own specific requirements (general safety rules, safety reports and specific requirements set by ASN decisions). The 19 inspections carried out showed few deviations from the safety frames of reference of the facilities. However, as some of these frames of reference were not up-to-date, this point will need to be confirmed for the facilities concerned. Certain periodic checks and tests are not performed either systematically or exhaustively. Several inspections thus led to improvements being required from the licensees with regard to this aspect. On the whole, the site personnel are trained in emergency management. The licensees must however take the necessary steps to ensure that this training is actually given to all the personnel liable to be concerned, including those from outside the site. In addition, this training should be supplemented by the organisation of crisis exercises on specific targeted topics (loss of electrical power supplies, loss of cooling functions). For crisis management on multi-licensee sites, agreements have been concluded between some licensees. The ASN inspectors asked that this practice be made general and that greater thought be given overall to a ranking of the interventions in the eventuality of a large number of facilities being simultaneously concerned. The ASN inspectors observed that the alert procedure trigger tests were performed satisfactorily. Nonetheless, the means required to trigger this alert could be rendered unserviceable in the event of a severe accident such as an earthquake or flood. The licensees must identify additional means to be implemented to prevent this risk. In a post-accident situation, the ASN inspectors observed that access to certain facilities would be difficult, for example in the case of very high water. In addition, the maintained operability of certain emergency resources was not always demonstrated, for example when they are housed in structures not designed to withstand the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). Management of these situations would be also be made difficult owing to the loss of the release monitoring resources following the loss of electrical power supplies, and the loss of telecommunications, the autonomy of which is limited. Several inspections revealed that auxiliary premises, emergency premises or premises housing response equipment and crews were not designed to withstand an SSE. The maintained accessibility of the backup electrical power supply resources must be examined. Finally, most of the sites have not established any procedures for long-duration crisis management.
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