- 54 - Masurca The siting of Masurca at Cadarache makes it relatively immune to off-site flooding, not considered by the licensee to be a potential risk. In any case, a significant anomaly was found during the inspection in that the site's general documents, given the prolonged shutdown of the facility (about 10 years) are no longer representative of the current level of risk to the facility. These documents state that the Masurca facility is one of the priority Cadarache facilities in terms of electrical power supply, which is no longer necessarily the case given that the core has been unloaded. A corrective action request was therefore submitted, consisting in updating: the PGSE (general presentation of the facility safety) regarding the list of priority facilities for backup electrical power, given the current situation of the Masurca facility (core unloaded); the various corresponding operational memos and procedures. 1.8 1.93.3 Protection of facilities against earthquakes 3.3.1 Experimental reactors In general, these facilities do not have a "seismic" referral agent, but tend to rely on centres of expertise (case of the CEA BNIs) or external parties if further expertise is needed on this subject. Reciprocal information agreements are defined (with the FLS and the office of the préfet in particular). These facilities also have several seismic detectors which are periodically inspected. Emergency shutdown measures are generally triggered by these detectors. Instructions in the event of an earthquake are also defined. Osiris The situation was felt to be satisfactory. However, the inspectors asked for checks on the strength of the UST (technical support unit) and FLS (local safety organisation) buildings on the centre, as they contain the emergency resources necessary for intervention on Osiris in the event of an earthquake and for the mitigation measures that could be necessary to allow access to the reactor. The inspectors also asked the licensee to define specific steps for reactor restart after an extreme natural phenomenon, particularly an earthquake. RHF Following the inspection, ASN asked that the licensee complete the final modifications that had been started further to the seismic reassessment performed between 2002 and 2007, concerning the increased seismic resistance of some of the equipment liable to constitute a hazard if it fell onto equipment important for safety. These modifications should have been completed by the summer of 2011. Concerning the modifications already made, the inspectors found that the documents summarising the quality of the work already done to strengthen the polar crane against a SSE were not finalised, even though the work had been completed. These documents will also be used to confirm the conformity of the work done with the proposed improvements. It would also appear necessary to raise the seismic risk awareness of the parties involved: the inspectors in this respect found that some carriages were not immobilised, that certain lifting cranes or booms were not in the safe position and that gas cylinders were not suitably stowed. The question of access to the site in the event of a major earthquake could also arise (peninsula configuration). Finally, it was mentioned that the means of communication were liable to be affected by an earthquake. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee intends to purchase a satellite telephone. The inspectors underline that the performance of an "earthquake" exercise in May 2011 and the real progress made are highly positive signs. Phénix The system monitoring radioactive gas effluents prior to release is not designed to seismic standards (as is the case with the Osiris and RHF reactors). The inspectors asked the licensee to detail the remedial measures necessary to keep the gaseous effluent monitoring system serviceable after an earthquake.
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