- 64 - in the event of loss of safeguard, the batteries provide one hour of operation for the stack discharge sampling and measurement devices. To conclude, the facility conforms to its frame of reference. The "normal" power supply is being strengthened by the installation of two functionally redundant GEF in place of the present single generating set. Finally, still in accordance with the safety analysis conducted at the design stage, the detection of criticality accidents (EDAC) and the monitoring of contamination are not safeguarded in a postseismic situation. In the event of a loss of safeguard, discharges would continue to be monitored for about one hour. The FBFC plant The plant is relatively immune to the risk of loss of electrical power supplies, a situation which it has already experienced for several hours. It has backup systems (electricity generating sets, batteries, etc.) which are in good condition and satisfactorily monitored. The plant's electricity generators have already undergone full-load endurance testing, which can only be considered a positive point. The premises containing the electricity generators and the batteries are not designed in accordance with seismic standards and their susceptibility to flooding is not known. However, as the licensee has made provisions for making the facilities safe as of the occurrence of a seismic, flooding or other type of alert, their availability is not required in order to prevent the occurrence of an accident. 3.5.3 Other facility ATPu The licensee's strategy is to cut the electrical power supplies in the event of an earthquake. There is thus no provision for raising personnel awareness of the loss of electrical power issue. There are two HV/LV PU1 (normal mode) and PU2 (secondary mode) substations. These two items are redundant. However, there is no automated system for switching from one to the other. Furthermore, they are not designed to withstand either an earthquake or flooding. Maintenance and the inspections and periodic tests on this equipment are performed by the centre (CEGELEC and COFELY companies managed by the STL). The facility has electricity generating sets running on fuel oil (GEF) and UPS devices (security and process system). As necessary, the licensee may call on the mobile electricity generators (GEM) of the FLS. In the event of loss of the normal electrical power supply, power to the stack discharge monitoring systems would be maintained for only 10 minutes, by means of the UPS devices. There is no procedure for total loss of electrical power. The licensee states that the BNI would be brought to a safe state (evacuation and automatic closure of doors). Renovation work is planned for the BNI 32 electrical network: replacement of all the cells by plans to build the new 63/15kV substation, with complete switchboard replacement for certain equipment items. The follow-up letters requested information on the current level of progress achieved in implementation of this plan of action. To conclude, the inspectors noted that the upkeep of the electrical network and the apparently good condition of the GEFs were points for satisfaction. 1.123.6 Operational management of accident situations and crisis management 3.6.1 Introduction and frame of reference considered This review is a summary of the inspections carried out in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, on the topic "operational management of accident situations" in the LUDD. The latest version of the inspection requirements comprises a list of 37 questions, drawn up from the LUDD PUI guideline plan of 1999, experience feedback from PUI inspections and the Fukushima event. As things currently stand, and pending the overhaul of the BNI regime, the frame of reference concerning crisis management in the LUDD is the PUI guideline plan communicated to the licensees in a letter of 28th March 1999. The only requirements concern the content of the PUI (PUI guideline plan of 1999).
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