- 66 - During the course of exercises, reflex response sheets are not always used, particularly on the Tricastin site or the RHF. PUI training Crisis management training generally comprises two parts: severe accidents specific to the site (developed in part A4 of the PUI) and the PUI functions occupied. Although personnel familiarity with the first part can be considered adequate, it would seem that training in performing the PUI functions could benefit from a more formal framework, particularly with regard to the use of reflex response sheets and competence monitoring and follow-up (CEA Saclay, ILL, AREVA NC Tricastin, GBII, Eurodif, Comurhex, Socatri, ATPu). On the sites of the AREVA group, some on-call staff have followed no specific or refresher training for their PUI duties, including the on-call managers (AREVA NC Tricastin, GBII, Eurodif, Socatri, Comurhex, FBFC). On the GB II site, the pool of available on-call staff was supplemented by Eurodif personnel who are not trained in the GB II PUI and whose skills and level of competence have not been verified. PUI and PPI trigger procedures in reflex phase The staff concerned are on the whole well familiar with the emergency plan trigger criteria. The powers of the préfet to trigger the PPI in the reflex phase have been delegated to most of the sites, except for CEA Saclay (currently at the signing stage): this responsibility lies with the head of the establishment. The question of sub-delegation of these powers within the licensee's organisation has been evoked (ILL, GB II) in order to identify whether this responsibility should lie with the on-call executive, the shift supervisor or the on-call manager. The inspectors asked for the decision-maker to be clearly identified, as this person may not actually be the executing party. Moreover, the participants in the crisis do not necessarily have decision-making guideline sheets or memorisation tools for effective, rapid, unambiguous detection (ILL, La Hague, Eurodif, GBII). On the CEA site at Saclay, the local PCs are unaware of any operational criteria to justify alerting of the site management. This point is also related to the definition of trigger criteria in the PUI. The definition of PUI and PPI reflex trigger criteria is all the more important outside normal working hours, during which the head of the establishment, who generally has sole responsibility for triggering the reflex PPI, is not necessarily available. A definition of the decision-maker within the site organisation, along with formal identification of this sub-delegation, is essential. The decision-maker must also permanently have at his disposal tools summarising the trigger criteria. In many facilities, the decision-maker also has to reach the site, with varying journey times. In the event of access problems (earthquake, flooding, chemical releases, etc.), the decision-makers should carry a case that they can use from their home (at least for triggering the first PUI/PPI alerts) and/or enabling them to delegate this decision. Others Management of the injured and counting of the personnel on the site are dealt with satisfactorily. Most of the sites rely on the FLS, which is capable of providing a real-time list of the persons present. For situations in which the majority of the personnel would be incapable of acting (e.g.: large-scale leak of highly toxic products following a major earthquake), the procedures and means of managing the crisis generally enable an alert to be sent very quickly to an outside entity, which could then take steps to call in material and human response resources, possibly from another site. However, this type of procedure is not relevant to a site such as La Hague, for which it would be hard to bring in emergency assistance from the outside. If off-site resources are to be called in, this would need to be covered by agreements. Implementation of these agreements must then be checked by means of drills. On the La Hague site, the security locking of access turnstiles and FLS lockdown of the site for "materials policing" reasons, would be such as to severely impede personnel transfers or even intervention by the FLS vehicles in the event of an earthquake.
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