- 69 - Self-sufficiency Most of the crisis premises are supplied with water and food to ensure independent operation, but sometimes far from adequately (ILL). Some sites stipulate transport from the site canteen, which raises the question of the feasibility of this measure in the event of earthquake, flooding or a toxic leak. The question of the provision of stable iodine tablets arises on the Tricastin site, because the fuel cycle facilities are located within the PPI reflex perimeter of the Tricastin NPP. The various licensees who are subsidiaries of AREVA have their own stocks in their own facilities, except for GB II and Socatri. All the workers on the Tricastin platform must have access to iodine tables pre-positioned in their facilities, in order to maintain an iodine administration time compatible with the accident scenarios envisaged in the reflex phase on the Tricastin EDF NPP. Remote PC No remote PC has been created for the LUDD. Only OSIRIS envisages fallback to the Saclay CCC (Saclay national crisis coordination centre) but the procedures have yet to be specified. The RHF has an emergency command post, but it is too small to accommodate all the crisis teams. Fallback to the CEA FLS was mentioned, but the procedures also need to be clarified. It is however worth remarking on the exercise conducted at FBFC, which rapidly adapted to total unavailability of the crisis premises by choosing to transfer the crisis cells to the gatehouse and doing so efficiently, even though several premises on the site were considered to be destroyed by earthquake or exposed to fire. 3.6.7 Conclusion For the CEA sites, the inspectors found that coordination between the sites and the various local PCs required better organisation in the PUI. For the local PCs, the inspections showed that a more robust organisation was necessary in order for them to handle their information transmission role, particularly: their composition in terms of PUI functions; personnel training in these functions (use of reflex response sheets and standard messages, directories, means of communication, etc.); operational criteria to justify alerting of the site management. These observations will need to be incorporated into the complementary safety assessments to be performed on the Cadarache and Marcoule sites in 2012. For the AREVA sites, specific training of the staff in their PUI functions, including for the management, must be given before they take on their on-call duties. Repeated nonconformities were observed. On the Tricastin site, the discrepancy with respect to the guideline plan concerning updating of the reflex response sheets within the PUIs must be dealt with. Moreover, accommodation of the FLS by the ELPIs and their coordination during the intervention is a major area for improvement. Finally, the pre-positioning of iodine tablet stocks, at least in the crisis PCs, is required at GBII and Socatri. For all the LUDD, the anomalies observed during the targeted inspections revealed five main areas of progress concerning the licensees and liable to constitute possible changes to the frame of reference: 1. appropriate training for the PUI position occupied, with the use of reflex response sheets; 2. improve the formal structure and responsibility for triggering the PPI in the reflex phase within the establishment's organisation, equipping the persons concerned with decisionmaking aids, taking the form of portable briefcases; 3. regularly carry out large-scale exercises involving several PCs and implementing off-site emergency response resources; 4. improve the availability of the crisis premises and assembly points, in the event of an earthquake or toxic release; 5. deploy the automatic population alert system to all the LUDDs.
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