- 9 - Three main aspects are included in this assessment: The steps taken in the design of the facility and its conformity with the design requirements applicable to it; The robustness of the facility beyond the level for which it was designed; the licensee in particular identifies the situations leading to a sudden deterioration of the accident sequences ("cliff-edge effects"6) and presents the measures taken to avoid them; All possible modifications liable to improve the facility's level of safety. 6.2 Specifications broader than the European specifications ASN decided to apply the complementary safety assessments to all French nuclear facilities and not simply to the power reactors. Thus, virtually all of the 150 French nuclear facilities will undergo a complementary safety assessment, including for example the EPR reactor currently under construction, or the spent fuel reprocessing plant at La Hague7. In this respect, the French specifications have been extended compared to those adopted at the European level by ENSREG. As of the beginning of the process, the association of stakeholders, particularly HCTISN, asked ASN to place particular emphasis on social, organisational and human factors, especially subcontracting. The Fukushima accident showed that the ability of the licensee and, as necessary, its subcontractors to organise and work together in the event of a severe accident is a key factor in the management of such a situation. This ability to organise is also a key aspect of accident prevention, facilities maintenance and the quality of their operation. The conditions for the use of subcontracting are also tackled in the French complementary safety assessments. On 3rd May 2011, the HCTISN issued a favourable opinion of the specifications for the complementary safety assessments. 6.3 Specifications which can also take account of some of the situations resulting from a malevolent act Even if the Fukushima accident involves no malevolent acts and even if such acts are not considered in the European Council conclusions of March 2011, the complementary safety assessments approach can cover some of the situations arising from such an act. Malevolent acts are in fact one of the possible causes (equipment failure, natural hazard, human activities) of a loss of electrical power or cooling which could lead to a nuclear accident. The loss of electrical power and cooling, regardless of the cause, are specifically covered by the complementary safety assessments and appear in this report. Specifically combating malevolent acts is being examined by the European Member States in a group devoted to this subject. The close link between these subjects (malevolent acts, safety) means that in most of the relevant countries (United States, Canada, Japan, Russia, Finland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, etc.) they are dealt with by the nuclear Regulatory Body. In this respect, France is an exception. 6.4 Categorization of the facilities concerned The complementary safety assessments concern virtually all the 150 basic nuclear installations in France (58 nuclear power generating reactors, EPR reactor under construction, research facilities, fuel cycle plants). 6 For example, in the case of flooding, the water level would gradually rise and a cliff-edge effect would be reached when the water level reaches the top of the embankment and floods the entire site. 7 Fewer than about ten facilities are excluded, as their decommissioning is nearing completion.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=