IRRS follow-up mission to France - October 2017

55 These inspections were carried out concomitantly with inspections of the Department for Nuclear Security. While this area has a good degree of commonality that one could consider them to be a joint inspection, to do so at BNIs and ICPEs is a very unlikely outcome due to the differing focus areas and being able to create a “need to know” basis for participation in security inspections. A more appropriate approach that is being pursued that could improve the understanding of safety/security interfaces is to conduct simultaneous inspections vice conducting “joint” inspections. With respect to the 2016 and 2017 inspections noted above, in order to improve further partnership during inspections on this topic and develop a better understanding and assessment of the safety/security interface, both authorities cooperated to design a common framework of issues to investigate. However, to ensure the confidentiality of their respective recommendations, the inspectors agreed to report separately to the carrier at the end of the inspection. Both authorities agreed to reiterate at least one coordinated inspection per year, beginning with the field of radioactive substance transportation. This was discussed in Suggestion 27, as were the efforts to better coordinate on emergency exercises. Suggestion 30: As noted in the discussion of the status of Recommendation 16, the government decided that the Department for Nuclear Security (DSN) of the Ministry for Ecological and Solidary Transition would continue to be responsible for ensuring the security for nuclear facilities. As noted earlier, ASN has worked more closely with HFDS/DSN over the last several years. This includes the establishment of specific points of contact at DSN and ASN, who are responsible for exchanging appropriate information and organizing periodic meetings where safety/security interfaces are discussed amongst various organizational levels. An update to a 2005 convention for co-operation between HFDS/DSN and ASN is currently under development and should be finalized by early 2018. This update will greatly improve the documented working relationship between DSN and ASN and better formalize the practices that are currently ongoing or are envisioned for how the two organizations will work together. Status of the finding in the initial mission Suggestion 29 (S29) is closed on the basis of progress made and confidence in the effective completion. Developing joint inspections at a BNI/ICPE is not a reasonable expectation given the existing roles and responsibilities that have been established. However, both ASN and DSN have already conducted several coordinated inspection activities in the transportation area, and are actively looking at how to expand upon that concept as well in other areas. Suggestion 30 (S30) is closed on the basis of progress made and confidence in effective completion. A revised version of the convention on the organization of ASN and DSN to exchange on subjects related to security and nuclear safety has been drafted and commented on by both ASN and DSN and is expected to be finalized in the coming months. Policy Discussion 3 The regulatory framework for control of the security of radioactive sources In 2015, the “Energy transition law” authorized the Government to establish provisions against malicious acts upon nuclear activities and in 2016, the “Nuclear ordinance” compelled the persons in charge of a nuclear activity to implement protection against malicious acts and identified the authorities both for authorization and control regarding security of radioactive sources. ASN is, with a few exceptions such as NPPs or facilities run by the Defence Department, the regulatory body for the security of sources. Currently, two draft regulations are under development: a draft