Abstracts ASN Report 2021

The Flamanville EPR reactor under construction In 2021, EDF continued with work to complete the installation, to make modifications to certain equipment and to draw up the various documents needed for the future operation of the reactor. The repairs on the main secondary systems welds also continued in good conditions. EDF is devoting considerable resources to these repairs. 1. ASN Chairman’s resolution CODEP-CLG-2020-021253 of 3 March 2020, setting binding requirements concerning the preparation fosr decommissioning of reactors Chinon A1 and A2 and the next steps in the decommissioning of reactors Bugey 1, Chinon A3, Saint-Laurent A1 and A2. EDF has taken the necessary measures to protect the installed equipment up until commissioning. It also continued with the inspections forming part of the equipment quality review, initiated after the detection of anomalies in the main secondary systems welds. The organisation put into place by EDF for performance and monitoring of these activities is satisfactory. Considerable works and examinations still remain before commissioning of the reactor. This in particular concerns the design and reliability of the primary system valves, repairs to the main secondary systemwelds, with anomalies on three nozzles of the main primary system and post-weld heat treatment of the nuclear pressure equipment, the performance of the f iltration system on a containment internal water tank, and the various anomalies detected on the cores of the Taishan EPR reactors, including the fuel clad ruptures observed in 2021. Nuclear power plants being decommissioned and waste management facilities ASN considers that the decommissioning and waste management operations were carried out in safety conditions there were on the whole satisfactory in 2021. EDF gave priority to risk reduction in its installations that had been def initively shut down. 2021 was notably marked by the removal of all the fuel from Fessenheim reactor 1, which had been shut down in February 2020. The fuel f rom reactor 2 should for its part be removed before the end of 2023. The other reactors (Brennilis, Superphénix, Gas-Cooled Reactors –GCRs) no longer contain any fuel. The main safety issues therefore concern the containment of radioactive substances and radiation protection. Some installations also present an additional risk linked to the presence of asbestos, sometimes combined with the presence of radiological contamination, which makes the intervention conditions more complex. 2021 was marked by the resumption of most of the decommissioning worksites, which had been partially interrupted in 2020 owing to the Covid-19 pandemic. The “outside pressure vessel” decommissioning work on the Saint-Laurent A, Bugey 1 and Chinon A3 sites is continuing in satisfactory conditions of safety. For these operations, EDF will have to be vigilant in meeting the deadlines stipulated in the resolution of 3 March 2020(1). ASN asked EDF to continue with its reactor pressure vessel diagnostic and monitoring programme, in order to monitor the ageing of the civil engineering structures and ensure their long-term integrity. The f irst results of these investigations should be presented in the decommissioning f iles to be submitted at the end of 2022. In these f iles, EDF will also be required to demonstrate that the GCRs are being decommissioned “as rapidly as possible, in economically acceptable conditions”. With regard to worker radiation protection, the “alpha” action plan implemented on the Chooz A installation in 2020 is resulting in a positive trend in the number of contaminations detected. Efforts in this field must however be continued on all the decommissioning worksites, in order to conf irm this trend over the course of 2022. A few worksites requiring the use of remote-operated cutting systems were interrupted owing to equipment unavailability problems. EDF will need to ensure correct maintenance of this equipment to avoid delaying the progress of the decommissioning operations. The decommissioning of the reactor pressure vessels of Superphénix and Chooz A is continuing with the stipulated deadlines, notably with the removal of the f irst R73 packages containing waste –resulting f rom cutting up of the Chooz A vessel internals– to Iceda, where the f irst packages were conditioned and stored at the end of 2021. The Iceda restart completion f ile, expected in 2022, will provide feedback regarding these initial conditioning operations. EDF is required to improve the periodic safety review process for def initively shut down installations, in particular regarding the approach for evaluating the conformity of the installations. ASN notes EDF’s involvement in the public inquiry on the Brennilis decommissioning f ile and, more generally, its efforts regarding transparency and communication. 14 ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 ASN ASSESSMENTS PER LICENSEE AND BY ACTIVITY SECTOR