Abstracts ASN Report 2021

a spillage of hazardous substances. This exercise revealed improvements in the prevention of uncontrolled flows in the facility. Moreover, EDF must now endeavour to def ine the material modifications necessary to ensure greater robustness in the management of accidental spillages combined with heavy rainfall. With regard to labour inspection, ASN observes on the whole that the workers know and comply with the safety requirements, but that continued improvements are necessary in this area. The ASN inspections have also evidenced deviations concerning, for example, compliance with work times, the electrical installation verif ications and the management of risks of tripping and falling. Penly nuclear power plant The Penly NPP operated by EDF in the Seine-Maritime département in the municipality of Penly, 15 km north-east of Dieppe, comprises two 1,300 MWe PWRs commissioned between 1990 and 1992. Reactor 1 constitutes BNI 136 and reactor 2 BNI 140. ASN considers that the performance of the Penly NPP with regard to nuclear safety, radiation protection and environmental protection is on the whole in line with its general assessment of EDF plant performance. At the end of 2021, EDF detected stress corrosion-related cracks in the circuits connected to the main pipes of the primary system of reactor 1. This issue will lead to a large-scale inspection and repair programme in 2022. With regard to nuclear safety, ASN considers that operating rigour dropped in 2021. Several notable events linked to the operational management activities were observed. Greater attention must thus be paid to the preparation of operational management activities in order to enhance their proper appropriation by the personnel tasked with performing them. ASN also considers that the licensee must ensure that a calm atmosphere is maintained in the control room under all circumstances. With regard to the maintenance operations, ASN considers that greater rigour is required in the management of the work files and that the monitoring of outside contractors must be further improved. Moreover, recurrent diff iculties are found in the characterisation of deviations and their monitoring over time. Lastly, on several occasions during its inspections ASN has observed deficiencies in the summary reports of the Nuclear Pressure Equipment (NPE) inspections. The licensee must be attentive to the quality of the files submitted to ASN before they are put back into service. The maintenance operations carried out during the reactor 2 refuelling outage were well managed on the whole. On the other hand, the start of the ten-yearly outage of reactor 1 was marked by a leak on the main primary system following the rupture of a flow meter during a valve tightness check. ASN conducted a reactive inspection which found deficient preparation and a lack of rigour in the development of the work intervention risk analyses. In the area of radiation protection, ASN considers that the site must continue the ongoing actions to correct the deviations observed in the last few years. ASN observes recurrent anomalies in the preparation of activities in controlled areas and in the radiation protection culture of the operators. The licensee must in particular try to review the procedures for the reception and awareness briefing of outside contractors. ASN also considers that particular attention must be paid to control of the contamination risk. With regard to environmental protection, the improvements made by the licensee have to be consolidated. More specifically, ASN considers that the Penly NPP has obtained satisfactory results in waste monitoring and management. EDF must nevertheless continue and finalise its action plan to significantly reduce its emissions of greenhouse gas (SF6) used to insulate electric lines. With regard to labour inspection, ASN considers that the licensee must improve its management of electrical installation conformity and the preparation of activities. ASN observed an increase in accidents in the second half of the year and will be attentive to the way the situation evolves and the measures taken by the licensee. Flamanville 3 EPR reactor construction worksite Following issuing of the Creation Authorisation Decree 2007‑534 of 10 April 2007 and the building permit, the Flamanville 3 EPR reactor has been under construction since September 2007. On 8 October 2020, ASN authorised partial commissioning of the Flamanville EPR reactor to allow the entry of nuclear fuel into the reactor perimeter and the performance of particular operating tests of the facility requiring the use of radioactive gases. Between 26 October 2020 and 24 June 2021, all the fuel assemblies were delivered for storage in the fuel building pool. In 2021, ASN conducted an inspection on the conditions of storage of these fuel assemblies and considers them satisfactory. In the f irst half of 2021, ASN inspected the f irst utilisation of radioactive gases within the facility. This inspection showed that the test in question was well prepared and the authorisation conditions granted by ASN for the utilisation of these radioactive tracer gases were satisf ied. The preparation for the overall requalification phase that EDF plans carrying out after repairing the Main Secondary Systems (MSS) was also inspected. ASN considers at this stage that it is conducted under satisfactory conditions. 74 ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2021 REGIONAL OVERVIEWOF NUCLEAR SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION