The polluted sites and soils in Île-de-France In Île‑de‑France, the Paris division oversees the depollution activities for polluted radiological sites, and can for example intervene to give technical opinions on site pollution management measures envisaged by the site owners (see chapter 15 of the full ASN Report, part 4). In this context, it carried out two inspections in 2023 on the site of the old Fort of Vaujours and the site of a former Marie Curie laboratory in Arcueil (near Paris), and participated in the site monitoring commissions for these two sites. By virtue of its expertise in these risks, the ASN Paris division also: • helped to define the measures to take to manage identified or potential cases of radiological pollution discovered in the operation of a gypsum quarry on the municipalities of Vaujours and Coubron; • issued three opinions concerning the measures to manage the radiological pollution of three sites: the land of a private individual in the Essonne département, an industrial site in the Seine‑et‑Marne département and the Curie Institute in the 5th arrondissement of Paris; • created and updated Soil hazard Information Sectors (SIS) concerning radiological pollutions; • monitored the diagnostic studies of three polluted sites in the Seine‑Saint‑Denis département with a view to their clean-up. The licensee must maintain its efforts to ensure the operational safety of its facilities. Safety is considered acceptable, even if areas for improvement have been identified in a number of technical subjects. In the light of the inspections carried out in 2023, several positive points can be underlined, such as the management and monitoring of the PE present on the site, the installation of new aerosol sampling devices and the conditions of response of the local safety organisation on site in situational exercises. Nevertheless, the need to be particularly vigilant on the fire theme identified in 2022 was confirmed in 2023. Work has started on bringing the fire doors of a building in BNI 165 into conformity, on putting the fire extinguishing systems of the shielded process lines of that BNI back into service, and replacing the fire control panel. The efforts put into these projects and works must continue in 2024 to achieve the required level of safety. An unannounced inspection confirmed that waste management still needs to be improved in both BNIs of the site. A change in the baseline requirements of these facilities is also required to allow methods of storage that are appropriate for the CEA’s operating risks and constraints. The licensee has made strong commitments regarding the implementation and scheduling of the corrective actions, including the creation of a role of scheduler. This project should allow the meeting of the CEA’s commitments to be tracked more effectively. With regard to the significant events notified in 2023, the number has increased with respect to the preceding years and they chiefly concern the fire theme, the storage of nuclear waste and the conditions of personnel access to areas presenting a radiological risk. Broadly speaking, the causes have to be analysed in greater depth and particular attention must be paid to the time frames for submitting the definitive significant event reports. Whatever the case, ASN notes that the CEA’s significant event detection capability is satisfactory. With regard to the periodic safety reviews of the facilities, the licensee has an organisational set-up that enables the associated actions to be implemented; in 2023, ASN signed the resolution setting the technical requirements stemming from the conclusions of the safety review of BNI 165. Examination of the periodic safety review of BNI 166 continued satisfactorily. After delays identified in the preceding years in the performance of the studies, in project programming and in the decommissioning schedule of the nuclear installations of Fontenay‑aux‑Roses, two of the CEA’s major decommissioning-related worksites were stopped for contractual and technical reasons in 2023. Resuming of these worksites will require changes in technical choices or modifications in certain aspects of the projects which could have an impact on the overall decommissioning strategy for BNI 166. The CEA must detail the expected consequences on the elements already transmitted. The CEA must continue to implement proactive measures to control and render reliable the time frames associated with these projects, particularly the deadlines announced for the submission of the decommissioning worksite preparatory studies. ASSESSMENT OF THE CEA FONTENAY-AUX-ROSES SITE ABSTRACTS – ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2023 69 Regional overview of nuclear safety and radiation protection • ÎLE-DE-FRANCE •
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=