Creation of the SCSIN Created by decree in 1973 following the first accident at the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux NPP, the Central Service of Nuclear Installations Safety (SCSIN) was responsible for preparing and im-plementing all the technical measures concerning nuclear safety: regulations, coordination of safety studies, nuclear information. It was this lean structure, attached to the Ministry of Indus-try, that was responsible for examining the Basic Nuclear Installation (BNI) authorisation application files. The Service became the Nuclear Installation Safety Directorate (DSIN) in 1991, and was renamed Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Directorate (DGSNR) in 2002. ASN was created directly from the DGSNR in 2006. Improvements in governance and techniques The experts from EDF and CEA considered the accident of 17 October 1969 to be exceptional. The analysis of the causes rapidly led to the cause of the accident being diagnosed as a combination between a human error and an error in the automatic loading system. This event led to improvements in the clad failure detection system of the GCRs and in the fuel handling devices. It was followed up by a group of experts (from the CEA and EDF, as well as the Ministry of Industry) in the months following the event. With regard to communication, the accident was not concealed but little was said about it. On 31 October 1969, an article published in the newspaper Le Monde reported the accident as an “incident”. This caused no particular reaction in France. The events of the accident were nevertheless published in a specialist review, and the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux NPP produced a film showing the different phases of the repair work. Three international conferences were held in London, Paris and in Germany between October and December 1970, showing a willingness to make the accident and the methods used to resolve it known to the specialists concerned, in France and abroad. Capitalising on lessons learned on a global scale The accident of 13 March 1980 underwent a more formal analysis than that of 1969, given the existence of an oversight organisation within the Ministry of Industry, namely the SCSIN – a forebear of ASN, as well as a public expert attached to the CEA, the IPSN, and an advisory committee of experts. The IPSN drew up two reports, one devoted to the accident of 13 February 1980, which points to organisational and human failures, the other to the accident of 13 March, indicating that there was a design problem. The IPSN experts also mention the failure to take into account the lessons learned from accidents that occurred in other countries: a precursor incident (tearing off of metal sheets) had occurred in the Vandellos NPP in Spain in 1976, a plant which was sold by France and was an exact copy of the Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux NPP (see quote opposite). The IPSN report on the accident of 13 March 1980 points out that: “this incident escaped attention”. Likewise, the risk of a projectile causing loss of cooling, which corresponds to the 1980 accident scenario, had not been taken into account when the loss-of-cooling risk was studied in the mid-1970s in France. ? What lessons can be learned from the nuclear accidents at Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux “ ...EDF must be particularly attentive to the functioning of the various reactors of the same type operating in other countries – especially Vandellos in Spain – in order to draw all the necessary lessons from incident precursor events.” SCSIN “GCR reactor nuclear power plants, Lessons learned from the incidents on the second plant unit of Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux A”, 13 January 1981 Nuclear accidents and developments in nuclear safety and radiation protection • 11
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