See glossary pages 33 to 36 ? How have nuclear safety and radiation protection evolved further to the Fukushima NPP accident 28 • Les cahiers Histoire de l’ASN • November 2023 Fukushima, the inevitable disaster scenario Within a few days after the accident, resources were mobilised at national, European and international level to learn lessons from it. In France, as soon as the Fukushima disaster was announced, ASN activated its emergency centre, which was then to operate 24/7 for a month. The goal was two-fold: to understand the causes of the accident and to continuously inform the French population. “I am very proud of what ASN has done concerning Fukushima. We had been preparing ourselves for the management of a major crisis for years, and we rose to the challenge. Especially given the fact that the licensee was geographically distant. I immediately declared the incident to be level 6 on the INES scale – whereas the Japanese were still rating it level 3 or 4 – and my assessment was passed on in the media and deemed authoritative by my foreign colleagues. The confidence that my counterparts placed in me in this respect was really very satisfying. I would add that for me, Fukushima brings back another memory, that of the IRRS mission – which serves to assess the regulatory infrastructure of a country in terms of nuclear safety – I conducted for the IAEA in Japan in 2007,. The mission concluded with report that was critical, but not as critical as I would have liked it to be. It nevertheless asked for an in-depth over-haul of the Japanese authority competent for nuclear safety. The Japanese never requested the follow-up mission which, as its name implies, examines the follow up to conclusions of the report. I learned that the Japanese government itself had decided not to give a follow-up to the report.” André-Claude Lacoste ASN Chairman from 2006 to 2012 Creation of an operational “hardened safety core” The aim was to put in place new items of equipment enabling the nuclear facilities to withstand degraded situations and function independently for several days. The “hardened safety core” is a significant and specifically French step forward, which should enable the essential safety functions of the reactors and spent fuel pools to be guaranteed in the event of an extreme hazard greater than that considered when designing the NPP earthquake, flooding (including very heavy rain), wind, lightning, hail and tornadoes. This “hardened safety core”, which is intended to prevent an accident with fuel melt and to limit large-scale releases and long-term effects in the environment, will be implemented as part of the safety improvements linked to continued operation of the 900 MWe and 1,300 MWe reactors beyond 40 years and the 1,450 MWe reactors beyond 30 years. Some of this equipment is already in place, such as the ultimate backup generating set. 1, 500 media queries 36 press releases 17 press briefings (between 12 March and 4 April 2011) 700,000 connections to the ASN website
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NjQ0NzU=