ASN Report 2022

1.1.4 Controlling urban development around nuclear sites The aim of controlling urban development is to limit the consequences of an accident for the population and property. An approach of this type has been in place since 1987 around non-nuclear industrial facilities and was reinforced following the AZF plant accident in Toulouse in 2001. Act 2006‑686 of 13 June 2006 concerning transparency and security on nuclear matters (TSN Act, now codified in Books I and V of the Environment Code), enables the public authorities to control urban development around BNIs, by implementing institutional controls limiting or prohibiting new constructions in the vicinity of these facilities. The actions to control urban development entail a division of responsibilities between the licensee, the Mayors and the State: ∙ The licensee is responsible for its activities and the related risks. ∙ The Mayor is responsible for producing the town planning documents and issuing building permits. ∙ The Prefect informs the Mayors of the existing risks, verifies the legality of the steps taken by the local authorities and may impose institutional controls as necessary. ASN supplies technical data in order to characterise the risk, and offers the Prefect its assistance in the urban development control process. The current approach to controlling activities around nuclear facilities exclusively concerns those subject to a PPI and primarily aims to preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans, in particular for sheltering and evacuation, while limiting the population numbers concerned as far as possible. It focuses on the PPI “reflex” zone, determined by the Circular of 10 March 2000 revising the PPIs for BNIs, the pertinence of which was confirmed by the instruction of 3 October 2016. In this “reflex” zone, immediate steps to protect the population are taken in the event of a rapidly developing accident (see point 1.1.1 b). A 17 February 2010 Circular from the Ministry responsible for the Environment concerning the control of activities in the vicinity of BNIs liable to present dangers off the site asked the Prefects to exercise increased vigilance with regard to urban development in the vicinity of nuclear facilities. This Circular states that the greatest possible attention must be paid to projects that are sensitive owing to their size, their purpose, or the difficulties they could entail in terms of protection of the general public in the “reflex” zone. ASN is consulted on construction or urban development projects situated within this zone. The opinions issued are based on the principles explained in ASN Guide No.15 on the control of activities around BNIs published in 2016. This guide, drawn up by a pluralistic working group jointly overseen by ASN and the General Directorate for Risk Prevention (DGPR), comprising elected officials and the National Association of Local Information Commissions and Committees (Anccli), has the following basic objectives: ∙ preserve the operational nature of the contingency plans; ∙ give priority to regional development outside the “reflex” zone; ∙ allow controlled development that meets the needs of the resident population. 1.2 The emergency situation stakeholders The response by the public authorities to a major nuclear or radiological accident is determined by a number of texts concerning nuclear safety, radiation protection, public order and civil protection, as well as by the emergency plans. Act 2004‑811 of 13 August 2004 on the Modernisation of Civil Protection, makes provision for an updated inventory of risks, an overhaul of operational planning, performance of exercises involving the general public, information and training of the general public, an operational watching brief and alert procedures. Several Decrees implementing this Act, codified in Articles L. 741‑1 to L. 741‑32 of the Domestic Security Code, more specifically concerning the Orsec plans and PPIs, clarified it in 2005. How radiological emergency situations are dealt with is specified in the Interministerial Directive of 7 April 2005 on the action of the public authorities in the case of an event leading to a radiological emergency situation (see Diagram 1). DIAGRAM Major nuclear or radiological accident national response plan 1 172 ASN Report on the state of nuclear safety and radiation protection in France in 2022 • 04 • Radiological emergency and post-accident situations 04